Few events obtain the same instant worldwide news coverage as multiple victim public shootings. These crimes allow us to study the alternative methods used to kill a large number of people (e.g., shootings versus bombings), marginal deterrence and the severity of the crime, substitutability of penalties, private versus public methods of deterrence and incapacitation, and whether attacks produce "copycats." The criminals who commit these crimes are also fairly unusual, recent evidence suggests that about half of these criminals have received a "formal diagnosis of mental illness, often schizophrenia." Yet, economists have not studied multiple victim shootings. Using data that extends until 1999 and includes the recent public school shootings, our results are surprising and dramatic. While arrest or conviction rates and the death penalty reduce "normal" murder rates and these attacks lead to new calls from more gun control, our results find that the only policy factor to have a consistently significant influence on multiple victim public shootings is the passage of concealed handgun laws. We explain why public shootings are more sensitive than other violent crimes to concealed handguns, why the laws reduce the number of shootings and have an even greater effect on their severity.
I. Introduction
Few events generate as much national and worldwide news coverage as when several people are shot and killed in a public place. Some highly publicized examples come readily to mind. Colin It is widely thought that the way to prevent multiple public shootings (the term we use to denote shootings in public places where two or more individuals are killed or injured) is to enact new and tougher laws that make it more difficult for individuals to obtain guns. To take an extreme example, recent public shootings in Australia and Scotland were followed by strict gun prohibitions in those countries. In the United States, public shootings have led to demands for national licensing of guns, laws requiring that guns be kept locked, and minimum waiting or cooling-off periods before a purchaser actually takes possession of a gun. By making it more difficult or costly for individuals to gain access to guns, these laws aim to reduce the likelihood that individuals will be able to carry out shooting sprees. The legislative response to public shootings, however, has not been uniform. In
Texas and several other states, multiple shootings have been followed by the passage of concealed handgun laws that permit law-abiding citizens to carry concealed handguns (hereafter, concealed handgun or right-to-carry laws). Likewise, terrorist shootings in Israel have lead to wider licensing of citizens to carry concealed handguns.
Those opposed to right-to-carry laws reason that these laws will make it easier for criminals to gain access to guns and that "if you introduce a gun into a violent encounter, it increases the chance that someone will die." 1 Consider the school shootings that took place from 1997 to 1999. The perpetrators obtained their guns from a vartiety of choices: relatives, neighbors, people at work, or other acquaintances. Had guns been less accessible or not purchased in the first place, these acts may not have been committed. This argument is reinforced by the belief that shootings in public places often arise from temporary fits of rage that are later regretted. Accordingly, enacting laws that make handguns less, not more accessible (even temporarily), should prevent many deaths. 2 In contrast, those favoring concealed handgun laws point to the potential benefits of employing guns for defensive purposes. They argue that the prospect of a criminal encountering a victim who may be armed will deter some attacks in the first place. National polls showing that people use guns defensively against criminal attacks in the range of 1.5 to 3.5 million times per year provide some support for this argument. 3 Data from the Department of Justice's National Crime Victimization Survey from 1979 to 1987 also indicate that the risk of serious injury from a criminal attack is 2.5 times greater for women offering no resistance than for women resisting with a gun (Southwick, 1996) . 4 The most comprehensive empirical study of concealed handgun laws finds that they reduce murder rates by about 1.5 percent for each additional year a law has been in effect, with similar declines in other violent crimes. 5 And contrary to a popular misconception, permit holders are virtually never involved in the commission of crime, let alone murder (Lott, 2000) . 6 Just as one can find examples of public shootings that support the desirability of more gun control, one can find other examples that support the opposite position. Consider the Luby's Cafeteria shooting in 1991. One of the surviving lunch patrons, an expert marksman, had left her handgun in her car to comply with the then existing Texas law. Had the gun remained in her possession, she might have been able to stop the attacker or, at least, limit the amount of damage he did. Law-abiding citizens have also used guns to stop gun-toting attackers at schools, restaurants, offices, and stores. 7 (See Lott (2000) for a list of such cases.). Similar examples can be found 3 Kleck, Gary, and Marc Gertz, "Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun," 86 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86 (Fall 1995) . For an extensive survey on this literature see Kleck (1997, chapter 5) and Cook and Ludwig (1996) . 4 There are problems with the National Crime Victimization Survey both in terms of its nonrepresentative sample (for example, it weights too heavily urban and minority populations) and its failure to adjust for many people not admitting to a law enforcement agency that they used a gun, even defensively. Unfortunately, this survey provides the only available evidence how the probability of significant injury varies with level and type of resistance. 5 Lott (1998b) finds these effects, but see related discussions by Bartley et. al., 1998; Black and Nagin, 1998; Bronars and Lott, 1998; Plassman and Tideman, 1998; Lott and Mustard, 1997; and Lott, 1998a. Ayres and Levitt (1998) discuss related empirical evidence of spillovers for the issue of lojack automobile alarms. 6 Unfortunately, no data are available on whether handguns lawfully bought by permit holders are used in crimes by another party at a later date. 7 One puzzle is why the media rarely reports the role of guns in ending attacks. C0nsider the shooting spree at a high school in Pearl, Miss. in 1997 that left two students dead. An assistant principal stopped the attack by retrieving his handgun from his car and physically immobilized the shooter for over five minutes before police arrived. A Lexis-Nexis search indicates that 687 articles appeared the first month after the attack but only 19 stories mentioned the assistant principal and only 10 mentioned that he used a gun to stop the attack. Some stories simply stated that the assistant principal was "credited by police with helping capture the boy'' or that he had disarmed the shooter. No story that mentioned the assistant principal's role was aired on the national evening news. A story on CBS with Dan Rather, which ran more than a month later, noted that the assistant principal "eventually subdued the young gunman." But these stories provided no explanation how of he had accomplished this feat. In another, school-related shooting in Edinboro, Pa., which left one teacher dead, the owner of a nearby restaurant, pointed a shotgun at the shooter as he was reloading his gun. The police did not arrive until 11 minutes later. Nearly 600 news stories discussed this crime during the next month, yet only 35 mentioned the restaurant owner's role. Moreover, these stories did not mention that a shotgun was used to stop the crime. what occurred at a [crowded venue in] Jerusalem some weeks before the California McDonald's massacre: three terrorists who attempted to machine-gun the throng managed to kill only one victim before being shot down by handgun carrying Israelis. Presented to the press the next day, the surviving terrorist complained that his group had not realized that Israeli civilians were armed. The terrorists had planned to machine-gun a succession of crowded spots, thinking that they would be able to escape before the police or army could arrive to deal with them. 9 Obviously allowing Israeli citizens to carry concealed handguns has not eliminated terrorist attacks. Indeed, terrorists may well have reacted to this change by substituting bombs for guns, which allow potential victims little chance to respond.
Anecdotal evidence cannot resolve the question whether laws allowing law-abiding persons to carry concealed handguns will save or cost lives. This study attempts to answer this question with respect to multiple victim public shootings. Our empirical analysis focuses primarily on right-tocarry (or "shall issue") laws, which allow law-abiding citizens to carry concealed handguns. We also examine the effects on public shootings of (1) laws that restrict access to handguns including mandatory waiting periods, one-gun-a-month purchase limitations, and safe storage gun laws; and (2) statutes that impose additional penalties on individuals who use guns in the commission of a crime 10
At the outset we offer a few remarks explaining why we study shootings in public places. There is of course the widespread interest or curiosity that people have in these kind of shootings. The more important reason, however, is that these shootings allow us to test the economic model in an area far outside the usual domain of economics. Perpetrators of multiple victim shootings are often thought to be psychotic, deranged, or irrational, and hence not responsive to costs and benefits.
Indeed, a series in the New York Times concluded that "About half [the 100 multiple victim public killers that they studied] had received formal diagnosis of mental illness, often schizophrenia" and In this paper we do not try to explain why the news media appear to ignore the role that guns have played in stopping shooting sprees. 8 10 We note that many national publications have called for these types of laws in the advent of public shootings. For example, the New York Times advocated "background checks, trigger locks and gun-show sales" restrictions as well as more comprehensive background checks as solutions to these attacks (New York Times Editorial, April 13, 2000, p. A30). the killings were described as "impulsive acts" 11 . Thus, legal sanctions or, as in this case, the prospect of encountering an armed individual during a shooting spree would have no deterrent effect on such individuals. Indeed, the act itself is cited as powerful evidence of irrational or psychotic behavior since a sane person would never kill helpless victims in a public place. From this, the claim is made that a law permitting individuals to carry concealed weapons would not deter shooting sprees in public places (though it might reduce the number of people killed or wounded).
Moreover, since concealed handgun laws might well increase the availability of guns to potential perpetrators, the combination of criminal irrationality and greater availability of guns should increase the number of multiple shooting incidents.
In contrast, the economic model of crime predicts that a right-to-carry law both will raise the potential perpetrator's cost (e.g., he is more likely to be wounded or killed or apprehended if he acts) and lower his expected benefit (e.g., he will do less damage if he encounters armed resistance).
Although not all offenders will alter their behavior in response to the law, some individuals will refrain from a shooting spree because their net gain is now negative. The size of this deterrent effect, in turn, will depend on how many potential offenders are close enough to the margin so that the passage of a right-to-carry law changes their net benefit from positive to negative. Economics predicts, therefore, that right-to-carry laws will reduce the number of mass shootings though the magnitude of this effect is uncertain. One important qualification should be noted. If a right to carry law also lowers the potential perpetrator's cost of obtaining or gaining access to a gun-say because there are more guns on the secondary market or it is easiers to steal a gun-the net effect of the law may be weaker or may even increase the number of public shootings.
Our study also allows us to compare whether a right-to-carry law will produce a greater deterrent effect on multiple shootings than on ordinary murders and other crimes. This may appear surprising in light of the claimed irrationality of individuals who go on shooting sprees. But another consideration points in the opposite direction. Suppose that a right-to-carry law deters crime primarily by raising the probability that a perpetrator will encounter a potential victim who is armed.
In a single victim crime, this probability is likely to be very low. Hence the deterrent effect of the law-though negative-might be relatively small. Now consider a shooting spree in a public place.
The likelihood that one or more potential victims or bystanders are armed would be very large even though the probability that any particular individual is armed is very low. 12 Tthis suggests a testable hypothesis: a right-to-carry law will have a bigger deterrent effect on shooting sprees in public 11 See New York Times Editorial, 2000, p. A30 12 To illustrate, let the probability (p) that a single individual carries a concealed handgun be .05. Assume further that there are 10 individuals in a public place. Then the probability that at least one of them is armed is about .40 (= 1 -(.95) 10 ). Even if (p) is only .025, the probability that at least one of ten people will be armed is .22 (= 1 -(.975) 10 ). This calculation assumes that the individual's probability of carrying a gun is independent of how many people there are in a public place. One might argue that this probability would be negatively related to the expected number of individuals because each individual expects (with a positive probability) that another law-abiding citizen carrying a gun will protect him. Still, the main argument would still hold provided "free riding" doesn't wipe out the incentive for any party to carry a gun.
places than on more conventional crimes. Finally, economists have long recognized that deterrence can impact not only whether a crime occurs but also its severity (George Stigler (1970) ). However, we are not aware of any studies on severity. Here the data allow us to examine both how many attacks are deterred as well as reductions in the severity of each attack.
II. Multiple Victim Public Shootings: A First Look
We analyze multiple public shootings in the United States in the time period 1977 to 1997 (and, in some cases, through 1999). 13 As noted earlier, we define a multiple public shooting as one in which two or more people are killed or wounded in a church, business, bar, street, government buildings, schools, public transit, place of employment, park, health care facility, mall or restaurant.
The main advantage of restricting the analysis to the United States is that we can compare states with and without right-to-carry laws at different points in time (holding other factors constant), and therefore estimate the effects of a state changing its law during the sample period. In contrast, time series data for a single country faces the problem that many different events may occur at approximately the same time, which can make it difficult to disentangle the impact of a change in the law from other factors. Similarly, the alternative of conducting an international cross-country study was ruled out because of difficulty finding comparable data on gun laws, crime rates, and gun ownership.
We collected data on multiple shootings from articles in the Lexis/Nexis computerized database from 1977 to 1997. We did not include all multiple shootings in the Lexis/Nexis database. We excluded multiple shootings that were byproducts of other crimes (e.g., a robbery or drug deal) or that involved gang activity (e.g., drive by shootings), professional hits or organized crime. We also did not count as a multiple shooting serial killings or killings that took place over the span of more than one day. 14 There are two reasons for excluding these types of multiple shootings.. First, since shall issue laws permit law-abiding citizens to carry guns, they should have little impact on killings related to gang activity, drug deals and organized crime. Putting to one side, injuries to bystanders, individuals involved in gangs, drugs and organized crime are already engaged in unlawful activities that often require them to carry guns. Their behavior will be largely 13 While the recent rash of public school shootings during the 1997-99 school largely took place after the period of our study, these incidents raise questions about the unintentional consequences of laws. All the public school shootings took place after a 1995 federal law banned guns (including permitted concealed handguns) within a thousand feet of a school. The possibility exists that attempts to outlaw guns from schools, no matter how well meaning, may have produced perverse effects. It is interesting to note that during the 1977 to 1995 period, 15 shootings took place in schools in states without right-to-carry laws and only one took place in a state with this type of law. There were 19 deaths and 97 injuries in states without the law, while there was one death and two injuries in states with the law. 14 In a recent paper (see T. Petee, K. Padgett and T. York, Debunking the Stereotype: An Examination of Mass Murder in Public Places, 1 Homicide Studies 317 (1997)) the authors find felony related mass murders account for 36 percent and gang motivated mass murder incidents for 5.8 percent over the 1965 to 1995 period. That study defines mass murders as the killing of three or more persons (so it has much fewer incidents than our sample).
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independent of whether a law on the books permits or prohibits citizens from carrying concealed handguns. Hence a "right-to-carry" law should not impact whether gang members or drug dealers are armed or kill each other.
Second, economic theory suggests a reason why a right-to-carry law will have a greater effect on multiple shootings in public places than on other types of shootings. 15 Assume that concealed handguns increase the number of individuals carrying handguns. Further assume that a right-tocarry law will have a greater deterrent effect the greater the likelihood that a potential victim (or bystander) is armed. Conversely, the law would have little deterrent effect if the offender knows in advance that the victim (or a relevant bystander) is armed. The latter circumstance is unlikely for public places unless there are separate prohibitions on carrying guns in certain places (e.g., near schools). In short, a right-to-carry law should increase the likelihood that an offender will encounter a potential victim or bystander in a public place who is armed. 16 The way we define multiple shootings-requiring two or more killings or injuries, rather than three or more or four or more and so on-is somewhat arbitrary. To deal with this objection, we also tested the effects of concealed handgun laws on alternative definitions of multiple shootings that require a greater number of deaths and injuries. In addition, we tested the effect of concealed handgun laws on multiple shooting data that others compiled after we started this project.
Since there are well documented problems with the FBI's Supplemental Homicide Report (SHR), we and other researchers have used news reports to document multiple victim killings (see for example, Petee et al., 1997 and for a more popular discussion of using news reports to identify attacks see Fessenden, 2000) . In the SHR, some events are double counted and others are left out.
The SHR does not provide information on where or how the attacks took place or the parties involved-for example, it does not report whether the shootings occurred during a gang fight or the commission of a robbery or other crime. 17 Another problem in that the shootings we want to study make up only a small fraction of the number contained in the SHR. Another point is worth mentioning. We cannot rule out that local or national news coverage reported in the Lexis/Nexis database may miss some local public shootings involving two or victims. On the other hand, it seems highly doubtful that news coverage will miss public shootings involving at least two or, say, 15 Alschuler (1997, p. 369) claims that concealed handguns should only deter crimes involving strangers. Our response is that concealed handguns can deter crimes involving acquaintances as well as strangers, though deterrence involving acquaintances might be more easily thought of as similar to open carrying of guns. The big effect of concealed handguns is that they may allow people to be able to now defend themselves outside of their home or business. The passage of the concealed handgun laws may deter crimes against acquaintances simply to the extent to which it increases gun ownership. 16 Most states allow private businesses to decide whether permit holders are allowed to carry concealed handguns on their premises. State rules may also vary with regard to other places such as government buildings, churches, and bars. 17 Our study has little to say about why gang fights over things like drug turf will be changing over time. Even if these cases were identified by the SHR data (and they are not) simply including a dummy variable for shootings due to gang fights would not properly account for all the impact that these changes might have. Indeed we would probably have to interact the dummy variable with all the variables used in the regressions that we will be reporting and thus it would be essentially the same as running a separate regression on these cases. four people killed. To deal with the possibility of missing data, we re-estimated some equations using these alternative definitions of public shootings. As it turns out, our results are not sensitive to these different definitions. 18 Tables 1 and 2 present data on multiple shootings for the United States as a whole, and for states with and without right-to-carry laws. Overall, we find that states without right-to-carry laws had more deaths and injuries from multiple shootings per year (both in absolute numbers and on a per capita basis) during the 1977 to 1997 period. Note also that the number of states with right-tocarry laws increased from 8 to 31 and the percentage of the U.S. population in these states rose from 8.5 to 50 percent in this period. Yet, states without right-to-carry laws still account for the large majority (often around 90 percent) of deaths and injuries. Turning to Table 2 , we find that the per capita rates of shootings and injuries are greater in states without right-to-carry laws in 34 of the 42 comparisons. (See the last two columns in Table 2 .) The annual differences are significantly different at least at the 4 percent level..
One noticeable feature of the data is the sharp increase in multiple shootings in the year 1996, and while the numbers decline for 1997, they are still high relative to other years. For example, the number of murders in 1996 are 47 percent higher than the previous high in 1993. While the share of multiple victim killings in right-to-carry states rose in 1996 and 1997 (compare columns (8)- (10) to columns (15)-(17) in Table 1 ), the number of states and the population covered with right-tocarry laws rose so much faster, the per capita rates are still lower in right-to-carry states (Table 2) . 19 Section VI also shows that the increased share during 1996 and 1997 shown in Table 1 arose because the nine states whose first full year with right-to-carry laws had much more restrictive rules on where guns were allowed and who could have them than earlier adopters.
Tables 3 and 4 present data for the 23 states that adopted right-to-carry laws between 1977 and 1997. 20 (No state has ever repealed this law.) Although there is upward national trend in multiple 18 However, as a comparison, we did use the SHR data. While the results consistently indicated that concealed handguns laws reduced the level and severity of attacks, the results were rarely statistically significant. 19 The year 1996 has an unusually high number of murders, injuries, and attacks. Prior to the 128 people who were killed in 1996, the largest number of deaths had been 87 in 1993. Injuries and the number of attacks showed the biggest increases in 1996. Prior to the 291 injuries recorded in 1996, the highest number was 92 in 1982. The year 1997 was also unusually dangerous, and includes some of the public school shootings. 20 The twenty-three states that enacted "shall issue" or "right-to-carry" laws in the 1977 to 1997 period (dates in parentheses) are as follows: Alaska (1994) , Arizona (1994) , Arkansas (1995 ), Florida (1987 ), Georgia (1989 , Idaho (1990) , Kentucky (1996 ), Louisiana (1996 , Maine (1985) , Mississippi (1990) , Montana (1991 ), Nevada (1995 ), North Carolina (1995 ), Oklahoma (1995 , Oregon (1990) , Pennsylvania (1989 ), South Carolina (1996 , Tennessee (1994) , Texas (1995 ), Virginia (1988 , Utah (1995 ), West Virginia (1989 ), and Wyoming (1994 . Some states like Texas passed the law in 1995, but they did not go into effect until January of 1996. The following eight states had "shall issue" laws over the entire period: Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Washington. Data on states having laws prior to 1993 are from Clayton E. Cramer and David B. Kopel, Shall Issue: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 Tennessee Law Review, 679 (1995) . We used a Nexis search to determine the state and date for states passing laws between 1993 and 1995. These two sources were also used in Lott and Mustard (1997) . Because of objections raised to the dates for "shall issue" laws in Maine and Virginia (see the discussion in Lott and Mustard), the regression analysis presented in part III examines the sensitivity of our findings to alternative dates for Maine and Virginia.
victim shooting murders and injuries from 1977 to 1997 (see columns (1)-(3) in Table 1), Table 3 shows large declines in crime over time in the states that passed right-to-carry laws. Murders fell by about 43 percent and injuries by 30 percent. 21 Table 4 indicates that the biggest drop occurred largely during the first full year after a state enacted its law (year "1" in the first column). Overall, the decline is so large that we observe zero multiple victim killings in two of the six years for all states with right-to-carry laws, an event that did not occur during any year before passage of the law. 22 Another point worth noting is that the decline in shootings between the pre-law and post-law periods in Table 4 is not the result of a few shootings incidents in the former period. The last two columns in Table 4 show that the two worst attacks accounted for 55 percent of the average annual deaths in the years before the right-to-carry laws were adopted compared to 64 percent after (excluding years in which there were no multiple victim murders).
Finally, consider the possibility noted earlier in connection with terrorist attacks in Israel; namely, the possibility that right-to-carry laws lead criminals to substitute bombings for shootings. Table 3 ) show that after the passage of right-to-carry laws, actual and attempted bombings increased slightly, while incendiary bombings and other bomb-related incidents (involving stolen explosives, threats to treasury facilities, and hoax devices) declined. 23
Data on bombings (see

III. Accounting for Other Factors
Although the above tables suggest that right-to-carry laws reduce mass shootings, other factors may explain these changes. To take account of this possibility and to deal with the count nature of the data, we estimated Poisson regressions with the following state specific variables: the arrest rate for murder; the probability of execution (equal to the number of executions per murder in a given year); real per capita personal income; real per capita government payments for income maintenance; unemployment insurance and retirement payments; the unemployment rate; the poverty rate; state population and population squared; and a set of demographic variables that subdivide a state's population into 36 different race, sex, and age groups (see data appendix). 24 Besides year and state fixed effects, we also include variables for other gun control laws in states such as whether a state has a waiting period before one can take delivery of a gun; the length of waiting period in days and days squared; whether a state limits an individual's gun purchases to 21 The reverse-a particularly large upward trend-occurred in states that did not change their law (see Table 13 ). 22 Of course, there were zero multiple shootings in individual states in particular years before the passage of concealed handgun laws. one per month; whether a state requires that a gun be safely stored; and whether a state impose enhanced penalties for using guns in the commission of crime. 25 Table 5 lists the variables included in the regression analysis. Since the regression analysis also includes year and state specific dummy variables, our results hold constant both the effects of any national trends and state-specific effects on multiple shootings. This implies, for example, that if the multiple shooting rate declines nationally between two years, the regression coefficient on the law variable tests if the decline is significantly larger in states that adopted laws during the two year period. (This approach may actually understate the impact of right-to-carry laws since the year dummy variables may also pick up some of the changes attributed to the increasing number of states that passed these laws.) Table 6 presents regressions for eight different dependent variables (four for multiple shootings and four for bombings) using a very simple specification of the right-to-carry law variable-a dummy law variable which equals one if a state has a concealed handgun or "right-to-carry ' law and zero otherwise. The regression analysis contains 1045 observations (50 states and the District of Columbia for 21 years minus 26 observations for various states and years in which we lacked data on the arrest rate). 26 To simplify the table, we only present the incidence rate ratios (and zstatistics) for the dummy law variable. Table 6 indicates that concealed handguns laws significantly reduce multiple shootings in public places (but have no systematic effects on bombings). For example, right-to-carry laws appear to lower the combined number of killings and injuries (equation (3)) in a state by 78 percent and the number of shootings (equation (4)) by 67 percent. The estimates imply that the average state passing these laws reduces the total number of murders and injuries per year from 1.91 to .42 and the number of shootings from .42 to .14. Although we might expect large deterrent effects from these laws because of the high probability that one or more potential victim or bystander will be armed, the drop in murders and injuries is surprisingly large. And as we shall see, alternative measures of shootings and adding other control variables do not seem to reduce the magnitude of the law's effect.
Appendix 2 shows the incidence rate ratios and z-statistics for all variables using specifications (3) and (4). We find that while arrest rates for murder lower the number of people harmed and the number of attacks in a state, income maintenance payments and unemployment have the opposite effects. A recent compilation of cases by the New York Times also found that so-called "rampage 25 See Lott (2000) for a discussion of these variables. For the source of penalties imposed for when a gun is used in a commission of a crime see Thomas B. Marvell and Carl E. Moody, The Impact of Enhanced Prison Terms for Felonies Committed with Guns," Criminology 33 (May 1995): 247, 258-61. 26 The states and years of the missing observations are as follows: Florida (1988); Illinois (1993-95); Iowa (1991) ; Kansas (1993-95) ; Kentucky (1988); Montana (1994-95); New Hampshire (1984 and 1995); Pennsylvania (1995) and Vermont (1978-79) . As a further check on our results, we reestimated the regressions in Tables 6 and 7 deleting the arrest variable and adding the 16 missing observations. The coefficients and levels of significance on the right to carry law dummy variable were virtually unchanged.
killers" were much more likely than other murderers to be unemployed (Fessenden, April 9, 2000, p. 28 ). Higher execution rates reduce the number of attacks and the number of people killed or injured, but these effects are not statistically significant. 27 Finally, none of the other gun laws produce significant changes in either multiple shooting regression. (We find similar results for equations (1) and (2). The full Poisson regressions are available from the authors on request.)
Turning to the bombing regressions in Table 6 , we observe that bombings are not systematically related to right-to-carry laws. After the passage of a law, some types of bombings appear to rise, others fall, and the signs often depend on whether bombings are expressed as a rate or an absolute number. Most coefficients are not statistically significant. In short, there appears to be no significant substitution between shootings and bombings in states enacting right-to-carry laws. Table 7 replaces the dummy law variable with two time trend law variables for those states that passed laws between 1985 and 1996 (no state passed a right to carry law during the years 1977 to 1984). The first variable is a time trend before passage of the law that takes the value 0 in the year the law is passed (and 0 in all years following passage), -1 in the year before passage, -2 in the second year before passage and so forth. The second variable takes the value 0 in the year the law is passed (and 0 in all years before passage), 1 in the first year after passage and so on. This specification enables us to test whether the impact of a right-to-carry law increases over time as more people obtain permits. It may take many years after enacting a handgun law for states to reach their long run level of handgun permits. For states in which data on handgun permits are available, the share of the population with permits is still increasing a decade after the passage of the law (Lott, 1998b, p. 75). 28 In Table 7 , we find that deaths or injuries from mass shootings remain fairly constant over time before the right-to-carry law is passed and falling afterwards (though the before law trend is only significant for the number of shootings). The F-test for the differences in these time trends is always significant at least at the .002 level. As expected, therefore, the longer a right-to-carry law 27 We note that the arrest rate variable understates the actual (or expected) arrest rate of individuals who go on shooting sprees. More than 90 percent of these offenders are either arrested or killed, which is slightly greater than the overall arrest rate for murder. The 90 percent figure (which comes from a Nexis search) represents perpetrators who were immediately captured or killed. We do not know whether those who escaped were apprehended later. 28 We note three other points related to Table 7 .
(1) Eight states in our sample had shall issue laws during the entire period. All eight passed their laws before 1960 and so should have reached their equilibrium level of permits before 1977 (the first year in our sample). The value assigned to two time trend variables for these states and states that never enacted laws is zero.
(2) A second reason for the split time trend specification is that if (relative to other states) shootings in states that pass right to carru laws are rising before the law goes into effect and falling thereafter, a dummy law variable would underestimate the law's impact (even though the regression contains year dummy variables). For example, imagine that the increase in shootings before the law is symmetrical with the decline after the law. A simple dummy variable for the presence or absence of the law could indicate that the law had no effect yet the law might well have caused a change in the trend from positive to negative.
(3) We also estimated regressions adding two time-squared variables for the law variables. Here we find the same pattern of declining murders and injuries after passage of the law with the decline flattening out by the sixth year after enactment of the law.
has been in effect in any of the 23 states that passed such laws in 1985 of later, the greater the decline in murders and injuries from mass public shootings. The incidence rate ratio implies about a 15 to 22 percent annual decline in these different measures of crime after concealed handguns are adopted.
The other gun related law variables generally produce no consistent significant impact on mass shootings. One exception is the impact of laws limiting a purchaser to no more than one-gun-amonth. All the estimates imply that limitations on purchases increase multiple shootings, though the statistical significance of this variable is driven solely by its impact on the number of injuries. The point estimates on the waiting period variables are not consistent. In some equations, a longer waiting period increases the risk of mass public shootings, in others it decreases the risk, and in only one equation is the variable statistically significant. A safe storage law has no significant effect in any equation. The imposition of additional penalties for using a gun in a crime significantly reduces the number of murders, but the impact on injuries and the number of attacks is statistically insignificant. Nor were any of the joint F-tests on the gun control variables statistically significant.
In sum, there is no evidence that these laws systematically reduce multiple shootings. 29 Although higher execution rates imply both fewer attacks and fewer people harmed, any statistical significance on the number harmed is through its impact on the number injured not killed.
Also note that the execution variable is probably only weakly related to the probability that a mass murderer will be executed, given the long delays before execution, its over-inclusiveness (i.e., the variable measures the execution rate for all murders not mass murders) and the fact that many of these offenders are killed during their attack. 30 The impact of the death penalty on public shootings is slightly larger in magnitude, but it is not as consistently significant as evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty on "normal" murders. Using state and county level data, we found that a one percentage point increase in the execution rate is associated with a four to seven percent decline in the overall murder rate and the effect is statistically significant at better than .01 percent level. 31 For multiple victim shootings, a one percentage point increase in the execution rate is associated with about a 10 percent reduction in the number of murders from multiple victim shootings, but it is never statistically significant for either the number of murders or shootings. 29 We also tried adding in a variable for the Brady Act, but it was essentially zero and had no effect on any of the other estimates. 30 We also tried including a simple dummy variable for whether the death penalty was in effect. The coefficient on this variable was never statistically significant, and it did not alter any other results. 31 The county level estimates with the execution rate correspond to the estimates in Table 4 .13 (Lott, 1998b) , and the coefficient on the execution rate is -7.21, with a t-statistic of -3.218. The smaller four percent effect is associated with the state level data. Table ( 7) indicate that the passage of concealed handgun laws have no significant effects on the number of bombings. There is no significant trend in any type bombing category, either before or after the passage of the law. Indeed, none of the gun control laws have any statistically significant effect on bombings.
Specifications (5) through (8) in
Because of the relatively large number of shootings that occur in the years that the right-to-carry laws are enacted and in the years immediately prior to adoption, one might suspect that our results simply reflect a regression to the mean. To deal with this possibility, Table 8 reestimates the regressions in Tables 6 and 7 removing observations for the year of passage and the two years passage. These new regressions confirmed our previous results. The coefficients for right-to-carry laws in the shooting regressions are statistically significant, with one exception-the change in before-and-after trends for injury rates remained slightly negative, but was no longer statistically significant.
In another set of regressions, we added murder and total bombing rates as explanatory variables. The rationale is that factors not accounted for by the independent variables in previous regressions may explain overall murders and bombings as well as public shootings. Adding the murder and bombing variables to the regressions in Tables 6, 7 , and 8, however, yield similar results to the regressions without these variables. In 13 of the 16 regressions, the right-to-carry variable still has a statistically significant negative effect on multiple shootings. 32 To further check whether the estimated impact of the right-to-carry laws is sensitive to the particular specification, we included different combinations of the various control variables. Some readers may believe that certain control variables are more likely to affect multiple victim attacks than other ones. But just as there are potential problems with excluding variables that should be included, problems can arise by including variables that should be excluded. Since readers may differ in their beliefs about which variables should be included, we tested the sensitivity of our results by breaking the control variables into six categories. They are all other gun laws, the execution rate, populate measures, the five measures of income and transfer payments, state unemployment and poverty rates, and 36 different demographic variables. We then ran 2 K combinations of these six categories. This involved 64 different regressions for each of the specifications reported in Table 7 .
The range of estimates are reported in Figure 1 , which shows both the maximum and minimum change in incidence rate ratios as well as the median change. For all the multiple victim public shooting regressions, passage of concealed handgun laws causes the percent annual change in crime rates to decline. For murders, the estimates range from 9 to 25 percent, for injuries from 1.2 to 22 percent, and for the number of shootings from 12 to 25 percent. The median incident rate ratio always implies an annual decline of at least 12 percent. By contrast, the bombing regressions 32 Even in the three cases where the coefficient is no longer statistically significant it is still negative. The three cases correspond to specifications 5, 6, and 8 in Table 8 , where the f-statistics for the difference in trends are 2.61, 0.09 and 1.59 respectively. The other 13 estimates are very similar to those already reported.
13
bounce all over the place, with positive and negative values for both the extreme values and even the signs of median estimates vary by type of bombing. The estimated median annual percent change is never greater than 1.3 percent.
In Tables 6, 7 and 8, we assumed that the passage of a right-to-carry law was an exogenous event. Following Lott and Mustard (1997, pp. 39-48) , we now assume that the likelihood that a state will enact a law depends on several political influence variables. These variables include: the National Rifle Association membership (as a percentage of the population), the percentage of votes received by the Republican presidential candidate in the state, fixed regional effects, and lagged violent and property crime rates plus changes in those rates between the two most recent periods. 33 The first stage (see the bottom half of Table 9 ) implies that states adopting these laws tend to be Republican, with low but rising violent crime rates. Higher NRA membership rates increase the likelihood of a law being adopted, but it is only significant at the twenty percent level. The second stage regressions support our earlier results. Adopting a right-to-carry law is associated with a significant decline in the combined number of multiple killings and injuries (both absolutely and per 100,000 persons). In the separate murder and injury regressions, the coefficients are always negative and either significant or marginally significant (a t-statistic greater that 1.65). 34
IV. The Number of People Killed or Injured Per Shooting
The preceding evidence indicates that right-to-carry laws reduce both the number of public shootings and the total number of people killed or injured. As mentioned in the introduction, we also expect the amount of harm per incident to decline. The follow examples illustrate this point.
During a shooting spree at a public school in Pearl, Mississippi, an assistant principal retrieved his gun and physically immobilized the shooter before he caused further harm (CNN, October 2, 1997, 2:40 PM EST). And in the public school related shooting in Edinboro, Pennsylvania, which left one teacher dead, a shot gun pointed at the offender while he was reloading prevented additional harm (Reuters Newswire, April 26, 1998) . The police did not arrive for another ten minutes. In the introduction we gave other examples where shooters have been stopped by citizens and thus presumably prevented from doing more harm. One can also imagine circumstances where right-tocarry laws increase the availability of guns to potential offenders, or where guns used in selfdefense lead to more, not fewer, killings. However, our results strongly indicate that these effects, if they exist, are not sufficient to offset the overall negative impact of right-to-carry laws on multiple shootings. 33 Since presidential elections occur every four years, we interacted the percentage voting Republican with dummy variables for the years adjacent to the relevant elections. Thus, the percentage of the vote obtained in 1980 is multiplied by a year dummy for the years 1979-82, and so on, through the 1996 election. 34 As a test of whether the shall issue laws were passed because of a shooting, we reestimated just first stage regression by itself after including the lagged murder or injury rate from the shootings to see if the law was adopted because of the shooting. While the coefficients on these lagged values were positive, neither variable was ever statistically significant.
In Table 10 , we examine whether the number of people killed or injured in multiple shootings declines, holding constant the number of shootings. Table 10 includes the number of shootings as an independent variable in the regressions in Tables 6 and 7 . If right-to-carry laws allow citizens to limit the amount of harm caused by these attacks, the number of persons harmed could fall relative to the number of shootings (as the two school shooting examples suggest). Using either the dummy law variable or the before-and-after time trends, the coefficients in Table 10 indicate that right-to-carry laws reduce the number of people harmed more than it reduces the number of shootings. 35, 36 As expected, the coefficients on the right-to-carry variable are smaller than those reported earlier, but they are still relatively large with the average number of people dying or being injured from these attacks declining by around 50 percent and the average annual decline being around 11 to 13 percent.
V. Alternative Measures of Multiple Shootings
Recently the New York Times ran a major series on so-called "rampage killings." The Times collected data on 100 killings that had taken place from 1949 to 1999 (Fessenden, 2000) . Their definition of "rampage killing" had many similarities to our own definition of multiple shootings.
The Times identified cases where at least two people had been killed in a public place and excluded attacks that arose out of another crime, such as a robbery or gang activity. The two main differences between the two definitions is that the Times included non-gun killings and excluded politically motivated attacks. There is, however, a major problem with the Times data. They included all cases for the years 1995 to 1999, but included only "easily obtainable" cases for years prior to 1995. 37 While the five-year period of 1995 to 1999 is relatively short, it still includes the public school shootings and many other notorious public shootings. We note, however, that public school shootings in right-to-carry states have occurred in areas where concealed handguns have been prohibited. Of course, excluding such cases would dramatically strengthens our results (not shown), but the estimates we report below (as well as our previously reported estimates) include public school shootings. Table   11 (A) cover the 1995 to 1999 period only and, as a result, data on most of the control variables are unavailable. These regressions include state population, population squared, and state and year fixed 35 Note that there are 234 observations in the deaths or injuries per shooting regressions although Table 1 indicates that there were 396 shootings in the sample period. The dependent variable in equations (1) -(3) in Table 10 equals the average number of deaths or injuries per shooting in a state in a year. Hence if there were two or more multiple shootings in a state in a year, this counted as one observation in the regression. 36 While individuals with permits produce a large social benefit, they risk being shot by the attacker. We have no instances where people with permits have indeed been shot, but this risk surely raises the prospects of whether citizens with permits should be compensated or at least not have to pay large fees for obtaining a permit. 37 For a discussion of the New York Times series see John R. Lott, Jr., "Rampage killing facts and fantasies," Washington Times, Wednesday, April 26, 2000, p. A15.
effects. The second set of regressions cover the Times data from 1977 to 1998. Here we can include all the control variables used in our previous regressions. The Times also lists eight "rampage killings" for the 1949 to 1976 period. All these killing occurred in states without right to carry laws.
For both the 1995-1999 and 1977-1998 period, we find that "rampage killings" declined by at least 47 percent after concealed handguns laws are passed. These results are statistically significant at the 5 percent (or lower) level for a two-tailed z-test (except for the first specification where the significance level is 12 percent level). The decline in the number of attacks in states enacting right to carry laws, range from 61 to 71 percent, but the effects are not statistically significant-(significance levels at around 20 percent). 38 In We are aware of one other study that collects data on multiple victim murders. This study defines multiple victim murders as shootings in which four or more people are killed (Petee et. al., 1997) . This way of defining the dependent variable greatly reduces the number of public shootings to 36 incidents over the entire 1977 to 1995 period. We attempted to explain both the per capita and absolute number of people killed in these shootings using the same specifications as in Tables 6   and 7 . 40 The results are similar to our earlier ones. We find that right-to-carry laws reduce the 38 The simple means also showed that the states that adopted right-to-carry laws during the 1995 to 1999 period experienced similar reductions in rampage killings. The average number of murders and injuries per state fell from 3.17 to 1.36 and the average number of attacks per state fell from .42 to .20. 39 The Northeast includes Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia; Midwest includes Illinois, Indiania, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; Rocky Mountains includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; and Pacific states includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington. 40 Again, the Poisson estimates do not converge when state fixed effects are used for there is not enough variation in the data to distinguish the law's impact on these shootings with state fixed effects. Consequently, the state fixed effects are replaced with regional dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West (the left out region)).
number of deaths, and that these deaths were increasing before passage of the law and falling thereafter. 41
VI. Explaining Permit Rates Using Differences in State Laws
There is one extremely notable trend in the nature of concealed handgun laws over time. The states that adopted right-to-carry laws early on tend to have much lower fees and training requirements and fewer restrictions on where concealed handguns can be taken. For example, eight of the fourteen least restrictive states on where one is allowed to carry a concealed handgun adopted their laws before 1961. By contrast, the first full year that five most restrictive states had their laws was 1996 or 1997. The exact same breakdown is true for the length of training requirements. To put it differently, the nine states whose first full year with the law was 1996 or 1997 required twice as much training as the 22 earlier states, had 1.9 times higher fees, and had 2.6 times more restrictions on where one could carry the gun. The question this section examines is what impact that these changes in rules have had how these rules have reduced the crime rate.
A. Examining the Differences in Training, Fee, and the Number of Years that the Permit Rules Have Been in Effect
Central to much of the debate over right-to-carry is the relationship between the percent of the population with permits and the changes in crime rates. In the preceding sections, we used as a proxy the number of years that the law has been in effect. While the data on permits is limited --10 states provided data over at least a few years (permit data since enactment is available for Florida, Oregon, and Pennsylvania; more recent data for a few years is available for Alaska, Arizona, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming), this data can used to predict how the percent of a state's adult population with permits has varied in other states. Four factors seem to have played important roles in explaining the percent of the state's population with permits: the length of time that right-to-carry laws have been in effect, the training period required, permit fees, and the crime rate.
It takes at least a decade for a state to reach its long-run stationary percentage of the population with permits. Shorter training periods, lower fees, and higher crime rates are associated with a greater percentage of the population getting permits. 42 However, while everything else equal we 41 In explaining the per capita number of people killed, the shall issue concealed handgun dummy incidence rate ratio was .325 (z-statistic = 3.1) and the difference in the before and after trends equalled .18 (z-statistic = 4.55). 42 A Tobit regression explaining the percent of the adult population with permits as a result of the number of hours of training required, the real permit fee, the number of years that the right-to-carry law has been in effect and the number of years squared, as well as the murder rate yields the following relationship:
Percent of the adult population with permits = -. increases the number of permit holders but on net decreases the amount of deterrence simply because permit holders will not be as able to deal with situations that might arise. The converse is also true. Training may make each permit holder better able to deal with an attack but at the same time so greatly reduce the number of permit holders that the net effect is to reduce deterrence.
There are two different ways of dealing with the differences in state laws and the rates at which permits are issued. We can estimate the relationship between the percent of the adult population with permits and changes in training, fees, the murder rate, and the length of time that the law has been in effect over the small sample of states with permit data and then use the much more readily available data on how these rules vary across states to estimate the predicted permit rate across states. Alternatively, we could simply include the different state laws directly in the earlier regressions. We examined both approaches, and both support the hypothesis that more permits reduce the number of attacks. (To save space, we report only the reduced form estimates, but the other results indicate a strong significant relationship between the percent of the population with permits and drops in multiple victim public shootings.)
What exact permitting rules are in place in each state largely depends upon when the laws were first enacted. Once in place, the rules seldom change very much. States that adopted right-to-carry laws only recently tend to have more restrictive licensing requirements. For example, the three states requiring at least 10 hours of training (Alaska, Arizona, and Texas) adopted their rules during the last few years of the sample period, with Arizona being the only right-to-carry state that requires additional training when permits are renewed. Six of the eight states with permitting fees of at least $100 have also enacted the law during the last few years. Overall, permit fees range widely, from $6 in South Dakota to $140 in Texas. About half the 31 right-to-carry states require no training, a quarter at 3 to 5 hours, and the remaining quarter between 6 to 10 hours.
The results in Table 12 generally confirm that longer training periods, lower fees, and the number of years since adoption reduce the number of people harmed from multiple victim shootings, though neither the effects from training periods nor fees is not statistically significant for murders. The increased deterrence from having right-to-carry law in effect for additional years rapidly diminishes with virtually all (99%) the impact on murders occurring within the first 8 years.
B. Examining the Impact of "Gun Free Zones"
One of the more controversial and important regulations of concealed handguns regards where permit holders can carry their weapons. Even if a concealed handgun law is in place, banning guns Based upon these fifty possible places where permits are prohibited and whether the penalty is a misdemeanor or a felony, Jeffrey creates an index that ranks states on a 0 to 74 scale, where 74 is the most restrictive rules: two points are given for each place that there is a statutory prohibition without discretion; one point if there is discretion; and an additional point is added if the prohibition violation is a felony. Indiana is assigned a value of zero, because their are no restrictions.
Pennsylvania is the next lowest, with a score of 2, because concealed handguns are banned in court houses, though there is no criminal penalty for a violation. At the other extreme, six states have scores over 60 (from highest to lowest they are: Arkansas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Texas, South Carolina, and Mississippi).
We did not include this scale in the first section of Table 12 , since the weightings are somewhat arbitrary. For example, it is not obvious that all places where concealed handguns are restricted are equally important. Nor is it clear that a felony is worth one point and that misdemeanors or no penalty should be treated equally. Yet, despite these concerns, the index is probably roughly correlated with how restrictive different states are. To account for these restrictions, we reran the regressions reported in the first section of Table 12 with a new variable using Jeffrey's index. The one change that we made was to reverse the order of the index so that higher scores now imply fewer restrictions and change the index so that it ranges from 1 to 75.
The new regressions shown in Section B clearly show that the states with the fewest gun free zones have the greatest reductions killings, injuries, and attacks. Each one point increase in the index is associated with about a two percent further reduction in these crimes and all the estimates are statistically significant at least at the one percent level. Table 13, Times implies that those stories were receiving more national news coverage, any fad effect should be strongest for that variable, but in fact it shows that recent news coverage reduces the number of attacks. In short, the evidence on fads is mixed. 44 One reason we may not find significant evidence of faddish behavior is that lagged shootings and lagged stories on shootings in the New York Times are highly collinear. To account for this collinearity, the last two regressions in Table 13 use either lagged shootings or lagged stories by variable that equalled one for the states that had an index value above the median and zero otherwise or the index. In both cases, the states with fewer gun free zones had fewer attacks and the differences were always significant at better than the .1 percent level. Using the simple dummy implied that the states with above the median level of freedom to carry concealed handguns had 58 percent fewer killings and injuries and 52 percent fewer attacks. 44 Note that October appears to be the most dangerous month although he number of shootings in October is only significantly greater than the number in January, September and November. Note, however, that the monthly dummy variables are not jointly significant.
themselves. However, the results remain unchanged: lagged values of shootings are positively related to monthly shootings while lagged differences are negatively related to differences in monthly shootings. Again, the percent of the population covered by right-to-carry laws continues to have a statistically significant reduction on the number of monthly shootings.
While we find little consistent support for the copycat hypothesis, we note that our data contains almost exclusively shootings by adults. The recent public school shootings, which involve children might be different. However, school shootings are very rare, making it impossible to study these shootings separately.
VIII. Conclusion
Right-to-carry laws reduce the number of people killed or wounded from multiple victim public shootings as many attackers are either deterred from attacking or when attacks do occur they are stopped before the police can arrive. We are able to provide evidence for the first time that the harm from crimes that still occur can be mitigated. Given that half the attackers in these multiple victim public shootings have had formal diagnoses of mental illness, the fact that some results indicate concealed handgun laws reduce these attacks by almost 70 percent is remarkable.
Differences in state right-to-carry laws are also important: restricting the places where permits are prohibited increases murders, injuries and shootings; more training requirements reduce injuries; and higher fees increase injuries and the number of attacks. The much greater deterrence that right-to-carry laws have for multiple victim public shootings than for other crimes like murder is consistent with the notion that a higher probability of citizens being able to defend themselves should produce a greater level of deterrence. The results are robust with respect to different specifications of the dependent variable, different specifications of the handgun law variable, and different control variables. Not only does the passage of a right-to-carry law have a significant impact on multiple shootings but it is the only gun law that appears to have a significant impact.
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